

Problems and Prospects of Nigeria's Federalism: Between Weakening the Center and National Disintegration

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Abstract

The problem of this study centers on the supposition that it is either federalism is reordered in Nigeria or the nation encounters a national stalemate. The paper is fundamentally about how the existing federal system in Nigeria may be made more effective. The general objective of the paper was to study the problems and prospects of the Nigerian federalism, focusing on weakening the center as plausible goal on one hand, and the imminence of national disintegration as dreadful consequence on the other hand. The contribution uses a normative methodology to study federalism in Nigeria, with creative destruction as theoretical framework. It recommends the weakening of the center in Nigeria's federalism and the limiting of the central government's areas of influence to external affairs, currency regulation, communication and defence of the federation from external aggression and internal insurrection.

Keywords: *Federalism, federation, federalist state, federal system, federating states,*

INTRODUCTION

Federalism is either reordered in Nigeria or the generic system encounters national disintegration. The problem of this study centers on this supposition. Watts (1998) opines that although federalism is no panacea to all problems of plural states, federal arrangements and the idea of federalism have shown that they can provide a means for reconciliation (in the interpretation of federalist thoughts). The challenge for scholars (Watts believes) is to contribute, by critical, objective, and comparative analyses, to a better understanding of how new federal systems may be established or the existing ones made more effective. This paper is fundamentally about how the existing federal system in Nigeria may be made more effective. The general objective of the paper is to study the problems and prospects of the Nigerian federalism, focusing on weakening the center as plausible goal on one hand, and the imminence of national disintegration as dreadful consequence on the other. Levy (2007, p.459) further argues that federalism, when it has not been ignored altogether in normative political theory, has typically been analyzed in terms that fail to match the institution as it

exists in the world. This contribution uses a normative methodology to analyze federalism in Nigeria, precisely as it exists. Creative destruction is the theoretical framework of the paper.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In *Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklungen* (his 1911 classic treatise) Joseph S. Schumpeter proposed a theory of creative destruction where new firms with the entrepreneurial spirit displaced the tired old enterprises, ultimately leading to a higher degree of economic growth. Even in *Capitalism and Democracy* (his 1942 classic) Schumpeter still argued that entrenched large corporations tended to resist change, forcing entrepreneurs to start new firms in order to pursue innovative activity (Audretsch & Fritsch, 1994, p.1). Reinert & Reinert (2006, p.56) however argue that contrary to the firm beliefs of the economics profession, the term ‘creative destruction’ was brought into economics not by Schumpeter but by Werner Sombart (1863-1941), the economist who was probably most influenced by Friedrich Nietzsche. According to Reinert & Reinert therefore, the idea of ‘creative destruction’ then entered the social sciences by way of Nietzsche but the term itself was first used by the German economist, Sombart, who openly acknowledged the influence of Nietzsche on his own economic theory. Further straightening the records, Reinert & Reinert (2006, pp.55-56) depose:

The 1990’s brought Joseph Alois Schumpeter (1883-1950) into the center stage of the economic debate. The Austrian-born economist had been teaching at Harvard from 1932 until his death. As the phenomena surrounding the ‘New Economy’ temporarily seemed to have cancelled the normal laws of economic gravity, Alan Greenspan heralded Schumpeter as the theoretician and prophet of the events. At the core of the phenomenon was the process of creative destruction that had become associated with the name of Schumpeter.

Then Chiles, Bluedorn & Gupta (2007, p.471) recognize ‘creative destruction’ as ‘Schumpeter’s famous phrase’. The theory was among the most important influences leading economists to focus on the nature of competition in real markets (Furst & Reeves, 2008, p.374). It is based on a universal idea that the birth of something new, is founded on the destruction of previous existence (Reinert & Reinert, 2006, p.58). Even human birth is preceded by the cessation of pregnancy. This work consequently adopts creative destruction from economics (not related to destroying the state) to intervene in the practice of federalism in Nigeria. In the application of these theoretical tenets to the paper, the focus has been on the plausibility of weakening the center in Nigerian federalism as methodology of avoiding an imminent national atrophy.

THEORIZING FEDERALISM

The idea and practice of linking separate and distinct political and national communities to achieve common objectives is an ancient one, dating back to the ancient Greeks in their City-States, though it was not called federalism at that time. The idea of federalism was later practiced in Switzerland around the 13th Century, though it fizzled out before the US federal system started. Contemporary federalism thus owes its origin to the United States of America (USA), arising from the country’s constitutional reform of 1787 in Philadelphia (Ayeni, 2018). Burgess (2006, p.9) adds:

The intellectual debate about modern federalism – its meaning and significance – can be traced back to the late eighteenth century. The peculiar circumstances that surrounded the shift from confederation to federation in the United States of America in the years between 1781 and 1789 shaped and molded the nature of the subsequent intellectual debate in a way which had far-reaching consequences for

understanding one of the most important historical innovations in modern government and politics. The American federal model established in 1789 was based upon a set of core principles that were consciously imitated by others, and in consequence it helped to spark an enduring analytical debate about what it meant to be 'federal'. In this sense the American federal precedent corresponded simultaneously to both theory and practice.

Tella, Doho & Bapeto (2014) refer to federalism as a political philosophy in which members of subnational groups are bound together with a governing representative head and a system of government in which sovereignty is constitutionally divided between a central governing authority and other constituent political units, such as states, regions or provinces. Federalism is then that structure of government in which exercise of governmental functions is shared between the central government and the federating units. It is used to describe the system of governance in a country whereby the exercise of governmental power is shared through constitutional provisions, among different levels of co-ordinate governments (Ugwuja & Ubaku, 2014, p.6). According to Burgess (2006) the meaning of federalism is only locatable within the context of a federation, which he describes as a particular kind of state, and federalism is the thinking that drives and promotes it.

Burgess (2006) further takes federalism to mean the recommendation and (sometimes) the active promotion of support for federation, which he sees as a distinctive organizational form or institutional fact, the main purpose of which is to accommodate the constituent units of a union in the decision-making procedure of the central government by means of constitutional entrenchment. Federalism consequently informs federation and vice versa in a complex relationship. Hence, much federalism differs widely in their content as they reflect different constellations and configurations of cleavage patterns both in a territorial and non-territorial sense (Burgess, 2006). The features of Nigerian federalism are identified in Bello (2016, p.24) to include:

- division of governmental powers between the federal and regional or state governments;
- derivation of powers of different levels of governments from the constitution;
- adoption of a written and rigid constitution;
- supremacy of the central government;
- the existence of a supreme court for judicial interpretation and review;
- unified police force;
- decentralization of the public service and judiciary;
- the existence of a bicameral legislature at the federal level;
- the principle of federal character, reflected in all national affairs and opportunities and
- a three tier system of government

Federalism combines a shared government (for specified common purposes) with autonomous action by constituent units of government that maintains their identity and distinctiveness (Watts, 1998, p.118). As a normative concept, federalism may involve one of two general approaches. One is the advocacy of a pragmatic balancing of citizen preferences for (a) joint action for certain purposes and (b) self-government of the constituent units for other purposes (Watts, 1998, p.120). Then there is the separate concept of federation. According to Watts (1998, p.121):

A federation is a compound polity combining constituent units and a general government, each possessing powers delegated to it by the people through a constitution, each empowered to deal directly with the citizens in the exercise of a significant portion of its legislative, administrative, and taxing powers, and each directly elected by its citizens.

Watts (1998, p.121) thus emphasizes the covenantal character of federations as a distinguishing feature, with the authority of each government derived from the constitution rather than from another government. Bednar (2011, p. 270) then highlights that essentially, federalism is about the distribution of authority between a central government and state governments. The issues of centralization and decentralization are accordingly inherent in federalisms as degrees of conformity to the federalist principles are assessed in the federating states.

Then relatedly, Boffa, Piolatto & Ponzetto (2016) researched how decentralization can undermine accountability (under federalism) and answers three questions: what determines if power should be centralized or decentralized when regions are heterogeneous? How many levels of government should there be and how should state borders be drawn? They developed a model of political agency in which voters differed in their ability to monitor rent-seeking politicians and found that rent extraction was a decreasing and convex function of the share of informed voters, because voter information improved monitoring but also reduced the appeal of holding office. As a result of this, information heterogeneity pushed toward centralization to reduce rent extraction. Taste heterogeneity on the other hand, pulled toward decentralization to match local preferences. This implies that optimal borders should cluster by tastes but ensure diversity of information. The researchers then also found economies of scope in accountability that explained why multiplying government tiers may harm efficiency. Consequently, a single government in charge of many policies has better incentives than many special-purpose governments splitting its budget and responsibilities. Hence, a federal system is desirable only if information varies enough across regions. Federalism is therefore not the ultimate system of government but must be made to operate as seamlessly and nationally profitable as practicable wherever it is in operation.

Burgess (2006, p.2) also underscores that the relationship between federalism and federation is symbiotic, as each impinges upon the other in an unending fashion. Citing King (1982), he highlights that like federation, federalism is both rooted in context and its meaning determined by this. According to Burgess (2006, p.2) therefore:

In order to understand each federalism, we must perforce locate the concept in its own distinct setting: historical, cultural, intellectual, philosophical, social, economic, legal and ideological. In this way we can begin to appreciate its huge multidimensional complexities. Federation, too, is similarly complex and contextual. As tangible institutional fact, it cannot be reduced to the mere end product of federalism. We do not move in a simple straight line from federalism to federation. Federation itself is governed by purpose ... conscious self-direction; it acts upon federalism, helping to shape and reshape both its expression and its goals.

Federalism has been described as a political organization in which the activities of government are divided between regional governments and a central government, in such a way that each kind of government has some activities on which it makes final decisions (Riker, 1975, p. 101). Unmasked of all complicated theorizations, federalism is a system of government in which the political territory is divided into units endowed with their own governments, and these territories, or states, are unified under a common government (Bednar, 2011, p.270). All federalism disorders are then traceable to how this definition is interpreted. When for instance, “unified under common government” becomes interpreted as license for the existence of a dominant government, this level of government at the center with an assumed superior legitimacy bordering on a right to guarantee the unifying mandate then begins to dominate the other federating units. Implicit in this definition however is the fact of the federating units being also “endowed with their own governments”. The dominance of a certain party or partner is accordingly not an attribute of federalism.

PROBLEMS OF NIGERIAN FEDERALISM

The Nigerian federation is a product of British colonialism and accordingly an imposition leading to a problematic geopolitical synthesis. This began in 1914 with the amalgamation of the former colonies and protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria. After the amalgamation, governmental powers started to be shared between the central government headed by the Governor-General and the governments of Northern and Southern protectorates headed by the Lieutenant Governors. With the existence and recognition of the two autonomous parts of Northern and Southern provinces, the administrative system of Nigeria wore an outlook of a federation (Thom-Otuya, 2013, p.30). But the proper seed of federalism was not sowed until 1946, when the Richards Constitution partitioned the country into three different regions (the Northern, Western and Eastern Regions of Nigeria). This could have marked a turning point in the history of the then British colony (Tella, Doho & Bapeto, 2014). But what actually happened? The paper continues to interrogate the surrounding issues as the problems of Nigerian federalism, in the format that follows.

Ideological Deficiency

Amadi, Echem & Nwoko (2017, p.49) highlight that the root to federalism in the Nigerian context was not as a result of negotiation, partnership, or collaboration but by imposition. The purpose of the federation was accordingly not very clear to the federating units. If it was clear to the colonial master, it was only to the extent that it aided and abetted his exploitation of the colonial territory for his own homeward interests. In place of partnership and collaboration, the emergent leaders of the Nigerian federating units began to engage in interregional rivalry. According to Ogunnoiki (2017, p.55) the origin of the word “federal” or “federalism” is traceable to the Latin words “foedus” and “fides” which when translated to English, the former means an agreement, treaty, compact or covenant while the latter means trust. The Nigerian federalism was neither preceded by such an agreement nor trust. There is then the absence of a supportive federal political culture emphasizing constitutionalism, tolerance, and recognition of distinctive regional groups (Elazar, 1993 in Watts, 1998, p.132).

Watts (1998, p.128) further opines that:

There has been considerable analysis of the processes by which federal systems and federations have been established. Germane studies have considered the interrelation among geographical, historical, economic, ecological, security, intellectual, cultural, demographic, and international factors in promoting both unity and regionalism, and the significance of these factors in the consideration of unitary, federal, and confederal alternatives. Also significant, is whether the process of establishment has involved aggregation, devolution, or a mixture of both and whether the creation of the federal system was achieved all at once or by stages.

Federalism in Nigeria does not lend itself amenable to any of the foregoing points. For instance, what were the geographical, historical, economic, ecological, security, intellectual, cultural, demographic, and international factors that motivated federalism in Nigeria? What was the significance of these factors in deciding on federalism for Nigeria? Was the process of establishing federalism in Nigeria driven by aggregation, devolution, or a mixture of both? If it was anchored on aggregation, what other ideals were aggregated other than the composite territories? It actually appears as if the indigenous inheritors of power in postcolonial Nigeria saw (have continued to see) the creation of the federal system as

something achieved all at once and not to be developed in stages. Federalism in the country is consequently characterized by ideological deficiency.

The Mono Product Federalism and the Specter of a Hegemonic Center

Several studies exist already on the mono-product nature of the Nigerian political economy and federalism, under which the life of the state is principally sustained singly by revenues from crude oil endowments (Ayadi & Boyd, 2006; Dode, 2012; Itumo, 2016; Ayadi, Hyman, Williams & Desselle, 2018). There are also complementary works on the rentier character of the state whereby the survival of the state is largely dependent on external rents from oil (Omeje, 2006; Adogamhe, 2008; Idemudia, 2010; Adibe, Nwagwu & Okorie, 2018). In the viewpoints of Ugwu & Okoli (2016, p.21) therefore, there has been a mutually reinforcing or bi-directional relationship between Nigeria's lopsided federalism and the rentier character of the state. Under this scenario, the imbalance in the federal system reinforces rentierism, while the rentierism itself entrenches the federal imbalance, since the central government is unwilling to let go the huge oil resources and inability of the states to discover other viable sources of revenue to reduce their dependence on the allocation from the federal government.

A lot has then been written about the gap between mere aspirations and actual practice in Nigerian federalism. And a critical component of the problem is the incidence of too much power and resources concentrated in the center (Ojo, 2009). Ideally, the federal government is a government of limited powers (Gerken, 2014, p.85). But the federal arrangement in Nigeria has been turned into a relationship of the center and its constitutional apparatchik, something akin to federalist hegemony. Successive state governors in the Nigerian federation are accordingly usually eager and exultant as they shake the hands of the President of the country (beaming with smiles) as they await the next phase of pronouncements from the center on how to make funds available to the states for services provision in their ostensible areas of jurisdiction. The mono product sources of fund had remained the only reliable source (now in any case, proving increasingly unreliable).

Continuing Ethnic and Religious Challenges

There are several studies suggesting that ethnically defined federal arrangements are prone to a variety of pathologies; they harden, rather than alleviate ethnic identities; they empower extremist ethnic leaders; they foster a zero-sum political dynamic at the center; they elevate a "primitive" form of identity over more elevated, progressive identities; they generate periodic state crises because they are unable to achieve equilibrium; and, ultimately, they equip ethnic groups with the resources needed to challenge the territorial integrity of the common-state. Hence, ethno federations are inherently vulnerable to the secession of one, or all, of the ethnically-defined subunits (Bunce, 1999; Snyder, 2000; Horowitz, 2002; Hale, 2004; Bunce and Watts, 2005; Aitken, 2007; Roeder, 2009; Anderson, 2012, p.4). However, what obtains in Nigeria is not strictly ethno federalism, suggesting the federating units being recognizable along ethnic lines. The Nigerian scenario is more appropriately classifiable as a multi-ethnic federalism, giving room for recognizing the presence of a multiplicity of ethnic groups among the federating units. Invariably, the ethnic question has remained a problem in the country's federalism along the lines of the issues identified by the above-mentioned studies. Then there is the added issue of religion being integral to federalism in the country so that besides maintaining the federal and ethnic character in all national affairs, the managers of state affairs are also compelled by either statutes or convention to maintain the religious character of the federation.

A Pervasive Militant Mentality

From 1914 (the date of amalgamation) till today, federalism in the country has not produced firm and steadfast believers in the principles of federalism. When the political actors are in control of the federally pooled quantum of funds at the center, and the other perquisites of exalted office in the oil-rich Nigeria, they prepare to defend federalism in the nation even with the last drops of their bloods. But these same leaders, usually in the twilight of their stay on the planet all invariably turn into new apostles of restructuring the federal state of Nigeria. Consequently, debates on federalism in Nigeria are always imbued with militancy on the side of the citizens who call for restructuring and the opposition usually coming from the government in power. Attempts at the convocation of any type of national conference, whether the so called sovereign type or the mere talk-shop version usually end in fiasco, whereby the different camps of militants scamper to safety.

A Diffused Leadership Vacuum

An important aspect of the establishment of federal systems is the degree of elite accommodation and public involvement in the process, although in the contemporary era, when the importance of democratic processes is increasingly emphasized, elite accommodation by itself may no longer be sufficient for legitimizing new political systems (Watts, 1998, p.128). But federalism in Nigeria commenced on notes of ambivalence and antagonisms in intertribal elite relations. Elite involvement has therefore always been mistaken for public involvement. But the elite only engage in self-centered machinations for power retention. This creates a diffused leadership vacuum in the country, which has produced neither federalists nor nationalists but mainly treasury looters as leaders.

PROSPECTS OF THE NIGERIAN FEDERALISM

Consequently, the prospects of federalism in Nigeria hang precariously between the possibilities of weakening the center, and probable national disintegration. Ojo (2009, p.394) argues that a federal arrangement that is still unable to resolve the problem of finding an acceptable revenue allocation formula is not good enough. But it is not even the failure to find an acceptable revenue allocation formula that is the problem. The larger issues have to do with the immense national reliance on an increasingly depleting and volatile oil revenue-sources for financing the current Nigerian federal arrangement. Ojo (2009, p.394) still argues:

Nigerians need to find a solution to the country's crisis of unity in fiscal federalism, political re-structuring, derivative revenue sharing and the extensive decentralization of the present warped union where there is too much power and resources concentrated in the center. In essence, Nigeria needs an entirely different governance approach based on a different philosophy that will guarantee groups' rights by recognizing the heterogeneity of the polity.

Gerken (2013, p. 1890) highlights that any account of federalism must begin with the values it serves, as the question at the core of this feature is whether federalism can serve nationalist ends. Federalism in Nigeria is currently a relationship among a national monstrosity at the center (sitting atop the affairs of the nation like a titan, superintending over national affairs) and some subaltern states claiming to be members of the putative federation. Federalism should promote economic development and more importantly, unity in diversity (Ogunnoiki, 2017, p.73). Federations are not therefore formed as unmovable structures, with every attempt to alter its designs classified as treason. Federalism implies potential power shifts between two levels of government (Karlhofer, & Pallaver, 2013).

The essence of federalism is in the functions of the federating units. If the responsibilities of the units are not overtly promoting the course of the federation, in the regards of national progress and productivity, the existing pretenses and hegemonies must be

discarded. There is this notorious position in the fictitiousness of census figures in the country. The fiction in the numbers remains maintained and the fabrications are retained because the existing hegemonies must not be exposed. But if the states were assigned critical social, economic and welfare responsibilities that they would not get fallouts from the center to execute, every state would quickly recast the claims in the true number of its occupants. The states would be obligated to the updating and defending of the figures as appropriate.

The two dominant and competing approaches to federalism in Nigeria have been nation-building and state-building. Several futile national efforts have been wasted on nation building, inclusive of a civil war fought between 1967 and 1970. The literature on state building is divergent and diffused, with the principal problem having to do with its relationship with nation building (Scott, 2007). Why the confusion persists is confounding. Nation building is the making of a nation (attempting to make a nation) out of disparate nationalities. State building is the catalyzing of durable state structures, systems and capacities where they were either weak or nonexistent. A plausible road to nation building in Nigeria is state building.

When state-building is achieved the instincts towards interethnic antagonisms becomes reduced. The interethnic struggle at the center to control the nationally collected volume of funds at that level for sectional usage will vanish. It has been this interethnic struggle that is maintained at the center and the victorious power at that level engages in a zero-sum game under the sobriquet of central government. In the face of dreadfully dwindling oil sources of income for this same center, maintaining the ethnic scarecrow at that level is becoming overwhelming for the actors, who need to be saved from their precarious pretenses of protecting federalism in Nigeria. It is either this center is weakened in the tradition of creative destruction or the leadership pretenders lead the country to national atrophy.

Watts (1998, p.128) adds that once established, federal systems are not static structures, they are dynamic, evolving entities. Consequently, the interactions of social, political, economic, and ethnic factors have shaped institutional structures and political processes, thereby producing trends toward centralization in some federal systems and decentralization in others. It is important that none of the trends remains static as this may lead to national atrophy. Federalism in Nigeria is overdue for a new trend. The proposed new Nigerian federation needs a structure that could compel wholesome competition among the component state governments in the federation, while the central government undertakes only the leading functions. Thom-Otuya (2013) suggests that the federal government functions in Nigeria need to be limited to defense, external affairs, currency regulation and communication.

Today, the Nigerian Central Government is the principal player in education, agriculture, roads construction and maintenance. The central government is in charge of prisons and prison warders, and provides policemen for every part of Nigeria. There is also currently in the country, a Ministry for Niger Delta Affairs under which the central government helps the oil-rich Niger Delta region of the country to manage their affairs from Abuja, the Federal Capital Territory. Federalism in Nigeria has therefore continued to be characterized by unitary tendencies (Ita, Ebong & Inimo-Etele, 2019).

There is in Nigeria today a school feeding programme under which Central Government officials go to schools in the cities and rural areas to feed school children on behalf of the federation. The Nigerian Central government is the supreme authority in football administration in the country, and the major player in the management of all sporting activities. So it is also at this central level of government that the responsibility for organizing the national annual sports festivals resides. The central government superintends over the elections of the officials of the Nigerian Football Association (NFA). Government at that level in the country must approve of who becomes coach at the senior or kindergarten level of all sporting activities in Nigeria. Even the monthly environmental sanitation exercise in

Nigeria was a brainchild of the government at the center. A major function of the Central government in Nigeria is the management of Pilgrims Welfare Boards for Christian and Islamic faithful who go to their different Holy Lands at different times of the year for prayers.

This same government at the central level also builds and operates refineries for the supply of refined petroleum products to Nigerians as diesel, kerosene and petrol. The country has these crude oil deposits in abundance. The central government is also the dominant actor in the importation of these very products into Nigeria under a historically fraudulent scheme or scam, whereby some Nigerians keep receiving what is called subsidy, for helping to import petroleum products into the country. The list of distractions and abuses is endless but principally, they are decoys for retaining the lion share of the federally pooled revenues of the country at the center, for self-centered and parochially induced dismemberment.

What is advocated in this paper is not the dumping of responsibilities on the states from the center, to render them comatose and precipitate national atrophy. The advocacy is for the unburdening of the center with the crippling preoccupations making it to lead the federation to a seeming anomy and national indeterminacy. Take the issue of security for instance, the state police debate has been endlessly ongoing in the country. In the meantime, a principal function of the current federal policing arrangement is the provision of VIP guards (the guarding of “very important personalities”) all over the country. If the services were truly provided for VIPs, it may not actually be burdensome on the national psyche and the generic security provision structure.

However, it is common knowledge that from all nooks and crannies of the country, this discriminatory protection is given only to anyone who can afford the cost of the services. The service beneficiaries usually range from different members of the Nigerian diaspora visiting home, to the domestic staff of the mendacious Nigerian business and political elite on daily errands. Invariably, the police protection is frequently extended to people of dubious credibility because they can pay for the services. Under a state policing architecture which this paper also recommends (though not in novelty), each state could then decide on how to fund such discriminatory service provisions and also make income for the state from such tendencies.

CONCLUSION

The paper recommends as a matter of national priority, the weakening of the center in Nigeria’s federalism and the limiting of the central government’s areas of influence to external affairs, currency regulation, communication, and defence of the federation from external aggression and internal insurrection. As the mono-product political economy remains the orthodoxy, comparatively adequate allocations should be made to the federating states for services provision. The central government in the proposed arrangement needs to divest from its current hegemony over tax revenue sources in the country. Mineral resources wherever they are found in the country are to belong to the states of domicile, which becomes obligated to remitting the requisite percentages to the center, for the maintenance of critically needed joint services. The component states of Nigeria are to become under this proposition, centers of creativity and productivity, as opposed to the current scenarios where the states are channels of funds allocation. Governance at the state levels would be spelt “work” in block letters, as different from the current tendencies where the states wait for crumbs from the center’s table to survive. The global economy of which the Nigerian unit is a subset is facing unprecedented challenges. An octopus central government in Nigeria’s federalism will continue to find it increasingly arduous, coping with the embedded challenges. The current trend of peacock federalism in the country needs to be urgently overturned by weakening the center before the nation encounters total atrophy.

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